Peering recipient picker: should group receivers expand to member names? (deep-dive) #234
Closed
opened 2026-08-14 17:17:38 +00:00 by Cordy
·
2 comments
No Branch/Tag specified
main
b12v07
b11v07
b10v07
ci-rc-publish
fx15-s3dry
b9v07
b8v07
bench742
b7v07
legal-texts-v0.2
b6v07
b5v07
b4v07
b3v07
sx1139
st742
b2v07
ix1102
fu1098
zp1097
wd1099
tr1100
qf1077
nc1070
ci1
rp1072
lk1073
ab1071
fi1074
si1070
ra1054
wo1056
oc1057
tf1055
sv1063
fg1059
st1058
fs929
mu1039
ls1033
cf975
lf835
dx1023
ml896
a11y2
av1022
r913
r7
r6
r5
r45
r23
r1
b10
b9
fix-b5
fix-b4
fix-b3
fix-b2
fix-b1
fix-922
fix-923
fix-911
fix-343b
batch-a
v0.6.413
v0.6.412
v0.6.411
v0.6.410
v0.6.409
v0.6.408
v0.6.407
v0.6.406
v0.6.405
v0.6.404
v0.6.403
v0.6.402
v0.6.401
v0.6.400
v0.6.399
v0.6.398
v0.6.397
v0.6.396
v0.6.395
v0.6.394
v0.6.393
v0.6.392
v0.6.391
v0.6.390
v0.6.389
v0.6.388
v0.6.387
v0.6.386
v0.6.385
v0.6.384
v0.6.383
v0.6.382
v0.6.381
v0.6.380
v0.6.379
v0.6.378
v0.6.377
v0.6.376
v0.6.375
v0.6.374
v0.6.373
v0.6.372
v0.6.371
v0.6.370
v0.6.369
v0.6.368
v0.6.367
v0.6.366
v0.6.365
v0.6.364
v0.6.363
v0.6.362
v0.6.361
v0.6.360
v0.6.359
v0.6.358
v0.6.357
v0.6.356
v0.6.355
v0.6.354
v0.6.353
v0.6.352
v0.6.351
v0.6.350
v0.6.349
v0.6.348
v0.6.347
v0.6.346
v0.6.345
v0.6.344
v0.6.343
v0.6.342
v0.6.341
v0.6.340
v0.6.339
v0.6.338
v0.6.337
v0.6.336
v0.6.335
v0.6.334
v0.6.333
v0.6.332
v0.6.331
v0.6.330
v0.6.329
v0.6.328
v0.6.327
v0.6.326
v0.6.325
v0.6.324
v0.6.323
v0.6.322
v0.6.321
v0.6.320
v0.6.319
v0.6.318
v0.6.317
v0.6.316
v0.6.315
v0.6.314
v0.6.313
v0.6.312
v0.6.311
v0.6.310
v0.6.309
v0.6.308
v0.6.307
v0.6.306
v0.6.305
v0.6.304
v0.6.303
v0.6.302
v0.6.301
v0.6.300
v0.6.299
v0.6.298
v0.6.297
v0.6.296
v0.6.295
v0.6.294
v0.6.293
v0.6.292
v0.6.291
v0.6.290
v0.6.289
v0.6.288
v0.6.287
v0.6.286
v0.6.285
v0.6.284
v0.6.283
v0.6.282
v0.6.281
v0.6.280
v0.6.279
v0.6.278
v0.6.277
v0.6.276
v0.6.275
v0.6.274
v0.6.273
v0.6.272
v0.6.271
v0.6.270
v0.6.269
v0.6.268
v0.6.267
v0.6.266
v0.6.265
v0.6.264
v0.6.263
v0.6.262
v0.6.261
v0.6.260
v0.6.259
v0.6.258
v0.6.257
v0.6.256
v0.6.255
v0.6.254
v0.6.253
v0.6.252
v0.6.251
v0.6.250
v0.6.249
v0.6.248
v0.6.247
v0.6.246
v0.6.245
v0.6.244
v0.6.243
v0.6.242
v0.6.241
v0.6.240
v0.6.239
v0.6.238
v0.6.237
v0.6.236
v0.6.235
v0.6.234
v0.6.233
v0.6.232
v0.6.231
v0.6.230
v0.6.229
v0.6.228
v0.6.227
v0.6.226
v0.6.225
v0.6.224
v0.6.223
v0.6.222
v0.6.221
v0.6.220
v0.6.219
v0.6.218
v0.6.217
v0.6.216
v0.6.215
v0.6.214
v0.6.213
v0.6.212
v0.6.211
v0.6.210
v0.6.209
v0.6.208
v0.6.207
v0.6.206
v0.6.205
v0.6.204
v0.6.203
v0.6.202
v0.6.201
v0.6.200
v0.6.199
v0.6.198
v0.6.197
v0.6.196
v0.6.195
v0.6.194
v0.6.193
v0.6.192
v0.6.191
v0.6.190
v0.6.189
v0.6.188
v0.6.187
v0.6.186
v0.6.185
v0.6.184
v0.6.183
v0.6.182
v0.6.181
v0.6.180
v0.6.179
v0.6.178
v0.6.177
v0.6.176
v0.6.175
v0.6.174
v0.6.173
v0.6.172
v0.6.171
v0.6.170
v0.6.169
v0.6.168
v0.6.167
v0.6.166
v0.6.165
v0.6.164
v0.6.163
v0.6.162
v0.6.161
v0.6.160
v0.6.159
v0.6.158
v0.6.157
v0.6.156
v0.6.155
v0.6.154
v0.6.153
v0.6.152
v0.6.151
v0.6.150
v0.6.149
v0.6.148
v0.6.147
v0.6.146
v0.6.145
v0.6.144
v0.6.143
v0.6.142
v0.6.141
v0.6.140
v0.6.139
v0.6.138
v0.6.137
v0.6.136
v0.6.135
v0.6.134
v0.6.133
v0.6.132
v0.6.131
v0.6.130
v0.6.129
v0.6.128
v0.6.127
v0.6.126
v0.6.125
v0.6.124
v0.6.123
v0.6.122
v0.6.121
v0.6.120
v0.6.119
v0.6.118
v0.6.117
v0.6.116
v0.6.115
v0.6.114
v0.6.113
v0.6.112
v0.6.111
v0.6.110
v0.6.109
v0.6.108
v0.6.107
v0.6.106
v0.6.105
v0.6.104
v0.6.103
v0.6.102
v0.6.101
v0.6.100
v0.6.99
v0.6.98
v0.6.97
v0.6.96
v0.6.95
v0.6.94
v0.6.93
v0.6.92
v0.6.91
v0.6.90
v0.6.89
v0.6.88
v0.6.87
v0.6.86
v0.6.85
v0.6.84
v0.6.83
v0.6.82
v0.6.81
v0.6.80
v0.6.79
v0.6.78
v0.6.77
v0.6.76
v0.6.75
v0.6.74
v0.6.73
v0.6.72
v0.6.71
v0.6.70
v0.6.69
v0.6.68
v0.6.67
v0.6.66
v0.6.65
v0.6.64
v0.6.63
v0.6.62
v0.6.61
v0.6.60
v0.6.59
v0.6.58
v0.6.57
v0.6.56
v0.6.55
v0.6.54
v0.6.53
v0.6.52
v0.6.51
v0.6.50
v0.6.49
v0.6.48
v0.6.47
v0.6.46
v0.6.45
v0.6.44
v0.6.43
v0.6.42
v0.6.41
v0.6.40
v0.6.39
v0.6.38
v0.6.37
v0.6.36
v0.6.35
v0.6.34
v0.6.33
v0.6.32
v0.6.31
v0.6.30
v0.6.29
v0.6.28
v0.6.25
v0.6.24
v0.6.23
v0.6.22
v0.6.21
v0.6.20
v0.6.19
v0.6.18
v0.6.17
v0.6.16
v0.6.15
v0.6.14
v0.6.12
v0.6.11
v0.6.10
v0.6.9
v0.6.8
v0.6.7
v0.6.6
v0.6.5
v0.6.4
v0.6.3
v0.6.2
v0.6.1
v0.6.0
v0.5.7
v0.5.6
v0.5.5
v0.5.4
v0.5.3
v0.5.2
v0.5.1
v0.5.0
v0.4.12
v0.4.11
v0.4.10
v0.4.9
v0.4.8
v0.4.7
v0.4.6
v0.4.5
v0.4.4
v0.4.3
v0.4.2
v0.4.1
v0.3.30
v0.3.29
v0.3.28
v0.3.27
v0.3.26
v0.3.25
v0.3.24
v0.3.23
v0.3.22
v0.3.21
v0.3.20
v0.3.19
v0.3.18
v0.3.17
v0.3.16
v0.3.15
v0.3.14
v0.3.13
v0.3.12
v0.3.11
v0.3.10
v0.3.9
v0.3.8
v0.3.7
v0.3.6
v0.3.5
v0.3.4
v0.3.3
v0.3.2
v0.3.1
v0.3.0
v0.2.7
v0.2.6
v0.2.5
v0.2.4
v0.2.3
v0.2.2
v0.2.1
v0.2.0
v0.0.3
v0.0.2
Labels
Clear labels
No items
No labels
Milestone
Clear milestone
No items
No milestone
Projects
Clear projects
No items
No project
Assignees
Clear assignees
No assignees
1 participant
Notifications
Due date
The due date is invalid or out of range. Please use the format "yyyy-mm-dd".
No due date set.
Dependencies
No dependencies set.
Reference: Cordy/Cairn#234
Reference in a new issue
No description provided.
Delete branch "%!s()"
Deleting a branch is permanent. Although the deleted branch may continue to exist for a short time before it actually gets removed, it CANNOT be undone in most cases. Continue?
Deep-research / deep-dive request. Evaluate permanent, sound approaches and give a ranked recommendation. Weight stability, security, long-term maintainability, and UX. Explicitly do not down-weight an option for being harder to implement — implementation cost is not an argument against the correct design.
What surfaced
During the 2026-08-14 A↔B peering dogfood (files/enc ↔ files-bao/openbao), the receivers allow-list on a peer was set to the
cairn-adminsgroup only (the explicit user was deliberately removed to test the group path). Result: the recipient picker (#125) rendered empty and degraded to free-text — even on files/enc, which has the Keycloak admin client.Root cause is by-design in the current build:
ListRecipients→Registry.ReceiverUsers(peer)returns only the explicitReceivers.Users, and never expandsReceivers.Groupsinto member usernames. So a group-only receivers list yields no suggestions anywhere.The divergence
This contradicts the wording of the recipient-discovery decision memo, Option 1: "Receivers allow-list ∩ resident users (group receivers resolved via #96; empty without the admin client)." The memo implied group receivers would be expanded where an enumeration source exists; the shipped implementation never expands them. The build-time note ("degrade silently, groups not expanded") quietly overrode the memo without recording a decision. That gap is what this issue exists to resolve properly.
Important scoping — authorization is NOT affected
To be explicit: real transfers to a group member already work. On
PrepareTransfer,Recipients.Existsresolves the recipient's groups live (#96) andCanReceivehonoursReceivers.Groups. So a send to acairn-adminsmember is authorized and delivered even with a group-only list. This issue is purely about the discovery / autocomplete UX: whether the picker should reflect group membership, not whether group-based authorization works.The question
Should the picker expand group receivers into member usernames when the instance can enumerate them — and if so, how, permanently and soundly?
Dimensions to evaluate
PrepareTransferprobes (the §4.3 oracle #125 already formalizes); #125 already returns explicit resident users. Does group expansion cross a genuinely new line, or is it the same set by another path? Decide with the threat model, not vibes.livegroups) is user→groups, not group→members — it cannot expand a group. Group→members needs either the Keycloak admin "get group members" API or the #226 candidates enumeration (Manager.Users/view-users). Which source; is it correct (not just "users ever seen"); and what is its availability across custody modes?Deliverable
Ranked options (e.g. never-expand / live-expand-when-admin-client / hint-only / hybrid) with a clear recommendation and the decision recorded, in the style of the recipient-discovery memo. Then a follow-up implementation issue if a change is chosen.
Refs: #125, #123, #96, #226; decision memo
cairn-peering-recipient-discovery-decision.Deep-dive: should the peering recipient picker expand group receivers?
Decision memo, style of
cairn-peering-recipient-discovery-decision. Weighting per the request: security, stability, long-term maintainability, UX. Implementation cost is not a factor.1. The truth in the code (verified against
main)Service.ListRecipientsiteratesRegistry.ReceiverUsers(peer)(explicitReceivers.Usersonly) and keeps eachuwhereRecipients.Exists(peer, u)(allow-listed and resident, the #123 delivery gate). Groups are never touched. Onepeer-recipient-listaudit event per call.PrepareTransfer → Recipients.Exists → CanReceive(peer, username, groups)resolves the recipient's groups live (#96, user→groups) and honoursReceivers.Groups. A send to acairn-adminsmember is authorized and delivered today with a group-only list. This issue changes no authorization behaviour.2. The enumeration-source constraint (this decides most of it)
Expanding a group needs group→members. The sources:
livegroupsManager.Users/ view-users)GET …/groups/{id}/members)query-groups/view-users)member/memberOfCorrectness landmine to record: #226's
Manager.Usersis the whole realm, not a group's members. Using it to "expand" a group would suggest non-members and users who'd be refused at delivery. Expansion must use a real group→members query, and must still be ∩ residents ∩CanReceive, so the picker never suggests someone the delivery gate would reject.3. The privacy line — does expansion cross a new one? (threat model, not vibes)
The issue's three counterweights, weighed:
Receiversallow-list lives on the receiver's peer entry; the group names are the receiver's taxonomy. The sender does not necessarily know them. Expansion discloses receiver-side group membership and, for the hint variant, receiver-side group names, to the sender.PrepareTransferoracle." — True but materially weaker than a dump. The oracle is guess-and-confirm: it validates a username the sender already suspected. Expansion is bulk disclosure: it hands over the membership list with no prior knowledge. Converting a bounded confirm-what-you-know oracle into an unbounded enumerate-from-nothing list is a real escalation, not the same set by another path.cairn-adminsmay itself be sensitive.Conclusion: expansion is a genuine, if modest, escalation in disclosure. Industry posture agrees — group→member enumeration to an external party is a recognized directory-enumeration risk, gated behind trust + audit (which the peering plane already has: mutual key auth, admin-established peering, per-call audit). It is a legitimate policy choice, but because it discloses the receiver's data to a third party, the choice belongs to the receiver admin, and the safe default is off.
4. Industry comparison
group@domain— the sender never expands it; the group is an opaque handle the remote server resolves internally at delivery. Enumeration is sidestepped entirely because the group is the address. Cairn can't copy this directly: delivery is per-username into/home/<recipient>/Inbox/<peer>/, so a group is not an addressable target today. Making it one (send-to-group fan-out) is a larger architectural change and is out of scope here — but it is the cleanest long-term answer to "how do I send to a team," and should be its own parked issue.5. Live vs materialized
Discovery must stay live (a group→members query at
ListRecipientstime), never a stored member list. A cached materialization reintroduces exactly the staleness/revocation window that the liveCanReceivedecision (#123/#125) closed. Non-negotiable: if we expand, we expand live, per send-dialog open.6. Ranked options
A — Never expand (status quo, made a recorded decision). Picker = explicit resident users only; group-only → empty → free-text; authz still live. Zero new disclosure, one contract everywhere, matches Nextcloud's no-sender-expansion posture. Costs the group-only UX.
B — Always live-expand where a source exists. keycloak-profile/LDAP expand via the real group→members query ∩ residents ∩
CanReceive; openbao/app-owned degrade. Best UX where possible, stays live, contained to the receiver. But makes bulk group-membership disclosure automatic and non-consensual for the receiver admin.C — Group-name hint only. No members; where
Receivers.Groupsis non-empty, show a non-selectable hint ("also: members ofcairn-admins— ask them for their username"). Some guidance, no member disclosure — but leaks receiver group names, and the hint isn't a valid send target.D — Opt-in live expansion (recommended). Default = A (never expand; safe floor). A receiver-admin toggle ("let peers see who's in receiver groups when discovering recipients") enables B where a real group→members source exists; otherwise free-text, optionally with C's hint. Live only; ∩ residents ∩
CanReceive; one audit event per call (already present).7. Recommendation — D, defaulting to A
Records the decision: discovery of group members is off by default, enabled per-instance by the receiver admin, live and source-gated, never materialized, never via
Manager.Users. Authorization is unchanged. Send-to-group fan-out (the Nextcloud model) is noted as a separate, larger future direction.Deliverable / next step
If D is ratified I'll cut the implementation issue: (i)
Registry.ReceiverGroups(peer)+ aGroupMembers(group)resolver interface implemented for keycloak-profile (group-members API) and LDAP, nil elsewhere; (ii) apeeringExpandGroupsreceiver setting (default false); (iii)ListRecipientsunions explicit users with live-expanded members ∩ residents ∩CanReceivewhen enabled; (iv) per-mode docs + the §4.3 threat-model note. Or say which of A / B / C you'd rather record instead.Refs: #125, #123, #96, #226; Nextcloud Federated Cloud Sharing (group-as-address model).
Decision recorded — Option D (ratified).
Group-receiver discovery is off by default, enabled per-instance by the receiver admin, resolved live and source-gated (real group→members query — Keycloak group-members API / LDAP; never
Manager.Users), never materialized, always ∩ residents ∩CanReceive. openbao / app-owned have no source and degrade to free-text. Authorization behaviour is unchanged. Send-to-group fan-out (the Nextcloud group-as-address model) is noted as a separate, larger future direction, not part of this.Implementation tracked in #243. Closing this deep-dive.