Password-only shares must not exist: protection is key-in-link, optionally + password #274
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Reference: Cordy/Cairn#274
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Decision (2026-08-18, follow-up to #269/#273)
The v0.6.44 dialog hotfix exposed a model problem: hiding the password field in key-in-link mode made the layered key+password share (v0.6.42) uncreatable, while "Password (sent separately)" mode still created password-only shares — where the password is the sole protection AND the key material.
Ruling: a password-only protection level should never even be possible. Every share link is key-in-link; a password, when set, is always an additional gate on top of the key. The Protection concept collapses from a mode choice into a single optional layer.
Changes
POST /api/v1/sharesno longer creates password-mode shares —mode: "password"(and the legacy inference from a bare password) coerces to fragment with the password kept as the layer, so older clients still get a working, stronger link."plain"stays as the policy-gated legacy escape hatch.Acceptance
mode:"password"requests produce layered fragment shares, not password-only ones.