Admin: revoke a user's app passwords (per-user button) #851

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opened 2026-10-06 21:38:45 +00:00 by Cordy · 2 comments
Owner

Follow-up from #838/#839 (v0.6.318).

Today

  • App passwords can only be managed by their owner: Account › App passwords, revoked one at a time. An admin has no way to see or revoke another user's app passwords.
  • An admin password reset deliberately leaves app passwords working. This mirrors D1: your own password change keeps them.
  • App passwords are removed automatically only when a local account is deleted, or when the directory reports the user deleted or disabled. If that automatic removal fails, see #849.

Problem

After a suspected compromise, an admin resets the password, but WebDAV/app access through existing app passwords keeps working until the user revokes them or they expire.

Proposal (Nikola, 2026-10-06)

A separate per-user action on Users & access, for example "Revoke app passwords", independent of the password reset. Also consider:

  • showing the count of active app passwords per user;
  • whether the reset dialog offers it as a checkbox;
  • an audit verb;
  • a notification to the user;
  • covering #849's leftover case (app passwords of an account that no longer exists).

Research prompt (do this when the issue is picked up, not before)

Find out how competitors and similar systems handle app passwords / app tokens on an admin password reset or a suspected compromise, with sources:

  • Nextcloud (app passwords, "wipe device", admin reset behaviour)
  • ownCloud / oCIS (app tokens)
  • Seafile
  • Google Workspace (app passwords on admin password reset)
  • Microsoft 365 / Entra (app passwords, "revoke sessions")
  • GitHub / GitLab (PATs on admin action)
  • Synology / QNAP (if relevant)

Note what worked and what caused trouble (support complaints, CVEs, user confusion). Also check the guidance: OWASP Authentication and Session Management cheat sheets, and NIST SP 800-63B on credential revocation after compromise. Then propose industry best practice "or beyond" and ask the open decisions.

Open decisions are asked when this is worked on: whether reset should revoke by default, the UI placement (needs a mockup first), and whether the user is notified.

Follow-up from #838/#839 (v0.6.318). ## Today - App passwords can only be managed by their owner: Account › App passwords, revoked one at a time. An admin has no way to see or revoke another user's app passwords. - An admin password reset deliberately leaves app passwords working. This mirrors D1: your own password change keeps them. - App passwords are removed automatically only when a local account is deleted, or when the directory reports the user deleted or disabled. If that automatic removal fails, see #849. ## Problem After a suspected compromise, an admin resets the password, but WebDAV/app access through existing app passwords keeps working until the user revokes them or they expire. ## Proposal (Nikola, 2026-10-06) A separate per-user action on Users & access, for example "Revoke app passwords", independent of the password reset. Also consider: - showing the count of active app passwords per user; - whether the reset dialog offers it as a checkbox; - an audit verb; - a notification to the user; - covering #849's leftover case (app passwords of an account that no longer exists). ## Research prompt (do this when the issue is picked up, not before) Find out how competitors and similar systems handle app passwords / app tokens on an admin password reset or a suspected compromise, with sources: - Nextcloud (app passwords, "wipe device", admin reset behaviour) - ownCloud / oCIS (app tokens) - Seafile - Google Workspace (app passwords on admin password reset) - Microsoft 365 / Entra (app passwords, "revoke sessions") - GitHub / GitLab (PATs on admin action) - Synology / QNAP (if relevant) Note what worked and what caused trouble (support complaints, CVEs, user confusion). Also check the guidance: OWASP Authentication and Session Management cheat sheets, and NIST SP 800-63B on credential revocation after compromise. Then propose industry best practice "or beyond" and ask the open decisions. Open decisions are asked when this is worked on: whether reset should revoke by default, the UI placement (needs a mockup first), and whether the user is notified.
Author
Owner

Research (2026-10-08)

System Admin can revoke a user's app passwords or tokens? Does a password reset revoke them?
Google Yes: the user's Security page, plus "reset sign-in cookies" Yes. A password change revokes all app passwords and OAuth tokens for Gmail, Calendar and similar (185833, 6328616). Users report confusing errors afterwards, because the old app password just fails.
Microsoft Entra Yes: Users › Authentication methods › delete app passwords (docs) No. Disabling app-password creation also leaves existing ones working; Microsoft says to block legacy auth with Conditional Access.
GitLab Yes: Credentials inventory lists PATs per user with last-used dates and a Revoke button; the user is emailed (docs) No, separate actions. The incident guide: identify, revoke, record the time, review the audit log (docs).
Nextcloud No UI. Only the user's own Devices & sessions page, remote wipe, or occ/the DB. Open requests ask admins to "kill all app tokens and sessions of a user" No. "Changing password will also not affect app passwords" (forum)
ownCloud classic No. The user terminates sessions; docs say to change the password first (docs) No
Pydio Cells (Enterprise) Yes: view and remove PATs in the user's edit panel n/a

Guidance

  • NIST SP 800-63B-4: on suspected compromise, suspend the authenticator; on confirmed compromise, revoke it.
  • ISO/IEC 27002:2022 5.17: keep records of significant events in managing authentication information. A revoke must be audited with who did it, for whom, and how many were revoked.
  • OWASP: a credential change should require reauthentication.

What worked and what caused trouble

  • Separate actions (Microsoft, GitLab) are clear for admins, but they get forgotten during an incident, which is the very gap this issue describes.
  • Automatic revocation on reset (Google) is safe, but it breaks sync clients silently and creates support load ("my mail stopped").
  • The middle road taken by GitLab and Entra works best:
    • a visible count of active tokens next to the user;
    • an explicit revoke action;
    • a user notification, so the owner knows why their devices stopped.
  • No admin tool at all (Nextcloud) is the most complained-about option.

Fit in Cairn

  • AppPasswordStore.DeleteUser(user) already exists; it is used for the delete and departed cleanup (#849).
  • What's new:
    • an admin endpoint plus the button;
    • a count in the accounts list;
    • an audit verb at admin tier, app-passwords-revoked-by-admin;
    • optionally, a bell item for the user.
  • Directory accounts can have app passwords too, so the action belongs on both the Local and Directory account rows.
  • #849's leftover case (an account that no longer exists) is already covered by the fail-closed cleanup. The count makes any leftover visible.

Open decisions are asked in chat and recorded here once answered. A mockup follows before any UI work.

## Research (2026-10-08) | System | Admin can revoke a user's app passwords or tokens? | Does a password reset revoke them? | |---|---|---| | Google | Yes: the user's Security page, plus "reset sign-in cookies" | **Yes.** A password change revokes all app passwords and OAuth tokens for Gmail, Calendar and similar ([185833](https://support.google.com/accounts/answer/185833), [6328616](https://support.google.com/a/answer/6328616)). Users report confusing errors afterwards, because the old app password just fails. | | Microsoft Entra | Yes: Users › Authentication methods › delete app passwords ([docs](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-ie/Entra/Identity/Authentication/howto-mfa-app-passwords)) | No. Disabling app-password creation also leaves existing ones working; Microsoft says to block legacy auth with Conditional Access. | | GitLab | Yes: Credentials inventory lists PATs per user with last-used dates and a Revoke button; the **user is emailed** ([docs](https://docs.gitlab.com/ee/user/admin_area/credentials_inventory.html)) | No, separate actions. The incident guide: identify, revoke, record the time, review the audit log ([docs](https://docs.gitlab.com/security/responding_to_security_incidents/)). | | Nextcloud | No UI. Only the user's own Devices & sessions page, remote wipe, or `occ`/the DB. Open requests ask admins to "kill all app tokens and sessions of a user" | No. "Changing password will also not affect app passwords" ([forum](https://help.nextcloud.com/t/api-reset-users-password/120070/3)) | | ownCloud classic | No. The user terminates sessions; docs say to change the password first ([docs](https://doc.owncloud.com/server/next/classic_ui/session_management.html)) | No | | Pydio Cells (Enterprise) | Yes: view and remove PATs in the user's edit panel | n/a | ### Guidance - **NIST SP 800-63B-4:** on suspected compromise, suspend the authenticator; on confirmed compromise, revoke it. - **ISO/IEC 27002:2022 5.17:** keep records of significant events in managing authentication information. A revoke must be audited with who did it, for whom, and how many were revoked. - **OWASP:** a credential change should require reauthentication. ### What worked and what caused trouble - Separate actions (Microsoft, GitLab) are clear for admins, but they get forgotten during an incident, which is the very gap this issue describes. - Automatic revocation on reset (Google) is safe, but it breaks sync clients silently and creates support load ("my mail stopped"). - The middle road taken by GitLab and Entra works best: - a visible count of active tokens next to the user; - an explicit revoke action; - a user notification, so the owner knows why their devices stopped. - No admin tool at all (Nextcloud) is the most complained-about option. ### Fit in Cairn - `AppPasswordStore.DeleteUser(user)` already exists; it is used for the delete and departed cleanup (#849). - What's new: - an admin endpoint plus the button; - a count in the accounts list; - an audit verb at admin tier, `app-passwords-revoked-by-admin`; - optionally, a bell item for the user. - Directory accounts can have app passwords too, so the action belongs on both the Local and Directory account rows. - #849's leftover case (an account that no longer exists) is already covered by the fail-closed cleanup. The count makes any leftover visible. Open decisions are asked in chat and recorded here once answered. A mockup follows before any UI work.
Author
Owner

Decisions (Nikola, 2026-10-08)

  1. Reset dialog: a checkbox "Also revoke N app passwords", unticked by default, so D1 stays the default. A separate "Revoke app passwords" action also goes in the row menu, for both local and directory accounts.
  2. Notify: a bell item for the user ("An administrator revoked your N app passwords…", linking to Account › App passwords), plus the admin-tier audit verb app-passwords-revoked-by-admin recording the admin, the user and the count.

A mockup (Users & access, batched with #859 item 4) follows before any UI work.

## Decisions (Nikola, 2026-10-08) 1. **Reset dialog:** a checkbox "Also revoke N app passwords", **unticked** by default, so D1 stays the default. A separate "Revoke app passwords" action also goes in the row menu, for both local and directory accounts. 2. **Notify:** a bell item for the user ("An administrator revoked your N app passwords…", linking to Account › App passwords), plus the admin-tier audit verb `app-passwords-revoked-by-admin` recording the admin, the user and the count. A mockup (Users & access, batched with #859 item 4) follows before any UI work.
Cordy closed this issue 2026-10-09 06:56:52 +00:00
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Reference: Cordy/Cairn#851
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